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Abstract. In this paper, the use of biometric systems in forensic ap-
plications is reviewed. Main differences between the aim of commercial
biometric systems and forensic reporting are highlighted, showing that
commercial biometric systems are not suited to directly report results
to a court of law. We propose the use of a Bayesian approach for foren-
sic reporting, in which the forensic scientist has to assess a meaningful
value, in the form of a likelihood ratio (LR). This value assist the court
in their decision making in a clear way, and can be computed using scores
coming from any biometric system, with independence of the biometric
discipline. LR computation in biometric systems is reviewed, and sta-
tistical assumptions regarding estimations involved in the process are
addressed. The paper is focused in handling small sample size effects in
such estimations, presenting novel experiments using a fingerprint and a
voice biometric system.
1 Introduction
The number of commercial applications of biometric systems has significantly
increased in the last years. As a consequence, forensic applications of biomet-
ric systems arise then in a natural way. Forensic reporting in cases involving
anthropomorphical or behavioral patterns can be assisted by using a biometric
system. For example, a sample pattern is recovered at the scene of a crime (e. g.,
a fingermark) and a court of law requests an expert opinion on the comparison
of such a mark with a template (e. g., a suspect’s fingerprint) from a suspect.
The aim of a forensic system in such a case is to report a meaningful value in
order for the court to assess the strength of the forensic evidence in this context
of identification of sources [1][2]. However, when a biometric system is used, this
value cannot be given neither by a decision or a threshold nor directly by a sim-
ilarity measure [1][3], because it may lead the forensic scientist to usurp the role
of the court, responsible of the actual decision [4]. Our point is that commercial,
score-based biometric systems are not suited for direct forensic reporting to a
court of law as has been stated in previous work [1][3].
To overcome this difficulty, the application of a likelihood ratio (LR) paradigm
suited for forensic evidence to score-based biometric system has been proposed
[2][3][5][6]. In this paper we propose to use this LR framework. Following this
approach the forensic scientist assesses and reports one meaningful value: the
LR, that allows the court to progress to a posterior opinion starting from his
prior opinion about the case before the forensic evidence analysis [5][7]. This
logical Bayesian framework implies a change of opinion when new information is
considered, i. e., when the weight of the evidence has been assessed [1]. LR Com-
putation can be performed using the scores from any biometric system [3][8][9],
the process being independent of the biometric discipline. Thus, the LR assessed
from the system scores can be used for direct forensic reporting. Our recent work
presents examples of LR computation using on-line signature, face and finger-
print biometric systems [9]. In [10], the ATVS forensic voice biometric system
is presented and excellent results in NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation 2004
[11] and NFI-TNO Forensic Evaluation 2003 [12] using robust LR computation
algorithms are shown. LRs can be used to compare the strength of the evi-
dence between different biometric systems and expert opinions, and allow the
combination of evidence weights coming from different and independent systems
[5].
The present paper describes briefly forensic interpretation and reporting us-
ing biometric systems by means of LR computation. Then the paper highlights
statistical assumptions regarding estimations involved in LR computation [9][10].
The novel contribution is focused on small data set effects [13] using different
estimation techniques. The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the
Bayesian analysis of forensic evidence and its motivation. In Sect. 3, the LR
computation process is reviewed, statistical assumptions commonly considered
are presented, and main approaches found in the literature in order to cope
with them are reviewed. Sect. 4 presents new experiments regarding general-
ization against small data set effects using different estimation techniques for
fingerprint and voice biometric systems. In Sect. 5, conclusions are extracted.
2 Forensic Interpretation of the Evidence
2.1 Score-Based Biometric Systems vs. Forensic Interpretation
The aim of commercial score-based biometric systems is to output a similarity
measure (score) between a user of the system, represented by a biometric test
pattern, and a claimed identity, represented by a biometric template. Biometric
verification is a classification problem involving two classes, namely target users
of the system and non-target users or impostors. A decision is made by comparing
the output score with a threshold. Assessment of these systems can be done by
means of decision theory tools such as ROC or DET curves [3].
The aim of forensic interpretation is different. Forensic evidence is defined
as the relationship between the suspect material (samples of biometric patterns
obtained from the suspect) and the mark (biometric pattern generally left in
association with a crime of disputed origin) involved in a case. The role of the
forensic scientist is to examine the material available (mark and control mate-
rial) and to assess the contribution of these findings with regards to competing
propositions arising from the circumstances and often the adversarial nature of
the criminal trial [6]. In sources attribution issues [2] such as the ones considered
here, the prosecutor view will suggest that the suspect left the mark whereas the
defense will support that an unknown contributor is the source [1][3][6]. The LR
framework we suggest bellow imply that the forensic scientist will only guide as
to the degree of support for one proposition versus the other and not comment,
probabilistically or otherwise, on the hypotheses themselves [1][6]. This role dif-
fers fundamentally from the natural objectives of a commercial biometric system
(i. e., making a decision) [3][4].
2.2 Bayesian Analysis of Forensic Evidence
The problems described above are handled elegantly when using the Bayesian
analysis of forensic evidences [1][5][6]. Following this approach, the interpretation
of the forensic findings is based on two competing hypotheses, namely Hp (the
biometric trace originates from the suspect, also called prosecutor hypothesis)
and Hd (the biometric trace originates from any other unknown individual, also
called defence hypothesis). The decision of the judge or jury (in one word the
fact finder) is based on the probabilities of the two hypotheses given all the
information of the case, that can be split into forensic information (E), and
background information (I) (i. e., all other information related to the case).
Using the Bayes Theorem [5], we can write in odds form:
Pr (Hp|E, I)
Pr (Hd|E, I) =
Pr (E|Hp, I)
Pr (E|Hd, I) ·
Pr (Hp| I)
Pr (Hd| I) (1)
In this way, the posterior probabilities needed by the fact finder can be sepa-
rated into prior probabilities, based only on the background information, and a
likelihood ratio (LR) that represents the strength of the analysis of the forensic
evidence in the inference from prior to posterior odds:
LR =
Pr (E|Hp, I)
Pr (E|Hd, I) (2)
The role of the forensic scientist lies therefore with the assessment of this LR.
The meaning of the LR is in essence independent of the forensic discipline [5],
and its assessment in a case can involve computation (such as in [8][9][3][14]) or
informed judgements expressed as subjective probabilities [15].
Assessment of forensic systems performance can be made using Tippett plots
[3][9] (see Fig. 3), which are cumulative distributions of LR for targets (when
Hp is true) and non target (when Hd is true) respectively.
3 Likelihood Ratio Computation in Score-based
Biometric Systems
As noted in [1], the numerator of the LR (Eq. 2), is obtained from knowledge
of the within-source variability (WS) of the suspect material. This distribu-
tion can be estimated using scores obtained by comparing biometric patterns
(controls) from the suspect to templates originating from the same suspect. On
the other hand, the denominator of the LR is obtained from knowledge of the
between-source (BS) distribution of the mark, which can be estimated from
scores resulting from the comparison of the mark with a set of biometric tem-
plates from a relevant population of individuals. The evidence score is computed
by comparing the mark with the suspect biometric template. Finally, the LR
value will be the ratio of the density of the evidence score under respectively
WS and BS [3][8], as is shown in Fig. 1. As the LR is conditioned by the pros-
ecutor (Hp) and defence (Hd) hypothesis and background information (I), the
forensic scientist has to estimate the WS and BS distributions based on the
data available in the case. Evidence scores significantly different from the data
set used in distribution estimations will give a non-informative LR value of one.
Fig. 1. LR Computation Steps.
3.1 Statistical Assumptions
In the estimation of WS and BS distributions for LR computation, some as-
sumptions have to be made. In order to estimate WS distribution, matching
conditions between the suspect biometric template and controls (see Fig. 1) is
needed [16][17]. However obtaining matching controls in real forensic casework
can be a very difficult task, especially in some biometric disciplines, leading to a
paucity of data. Therefore, generalization is desirable to avoid small sample size
effects [13]. Approaches based on modelling WS distributions using databases
can be found in [16]. More robust techniques based on additional knowledge
about the system behavior are shown in [10], in which they can be also found
procedures to optimize the use of the suspect data.
BS estimation problems related to mismatch between the considered relevant
population and the conditions of the mark have been explored in [10] and [17] for
voice biometric systems. In [18], corpus-based techniques are applied to reduce
the mismatch between the population and suspect templates. Also, the nature of
the population is conditioned to the circumstances of the case (I). The relevant
population can then be reduced, either according to I, or because of the lack of
databases matching the conditions of the case under study. If the population size
is small, non-matching conditions between population templates and questioned
patterns can seriously degrade system performance.
The novel contribution of this work focuses on small sample size effects, not
related to forensic issues of the partiality, poor quality or degradation of marks.
Thus, the scenarios explored will postulate marks of quality comparable with
the control material. In that sense, we have a symmetry in term of amount of
information between the mark and the suspect material.
3.2 Between-source Distribution Modelling Techniques
In this paper, we concentrate on BS modelling. We propose to assess two dif-
ferent estimation techniques, one parametric and one non-parametric, to model
BS distributions. The parametric approach, proposed in [3], consist in modelling
BS with a one-dimensional mixture of gaussian components:
p (x) =
M∑
m=1
pm · bm (x) (3)
where M is the number of mixtures used, and pm are restricted to:
M∑
m=1
pm = 1 (4)
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation using this parametric model is carried
out by the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [19].
On the other hand, Kernel Density Functions (KDF ) [19] are used. In this
non-parametric technique the score-axis is divided in regions (bins) of length h.
If N samples are available, and kN of these samples fall in a bin, the probability
estimated for that bin will be kN/N . So the corresponding density will be:
pˆ (x) ≡ pˆ (x0) ≈ 1
h
kN
N
, |x− x0| ≤ h2 (5)
Using smooth functions φ, known as kernels, where φ ≥ 0 and:∫
x
φ (x) · dx = 1 (6)
then the resulting estimated function is a legitimate pdf.
4 Experiments
In order to test the performance of the BS estimation techniques proposed, we
present experiments using a fingerprint and a voice biometric system respectively.
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Fig. 2. DET curve of: (a) ATVS reference fingerprint system with MCYT corpus, and
(b) ATVS reference voice biometric system with NIST SRE 2004 sub-corpus
4.1 Databases, Experimental Protocol and Biometric Systems
For fingerprint experiments, the ATVS fingerprint recognition system based on
minutiae comparison [20] has been used. A sub-corpus from the MCYT finger-
print database [21] has been selected, consisting of 50 users each one having
10 fingerprint samples. One sample per user will be used as reference biometric
template. For score-based system performance assessment via DET plots, the 9
remaining samples will be used as test patterns (marks), so a total of 50×9 = 450
target trials and 50×49×9 = 22050 non-target trials have been considered. For
the forensic interpretation system, 5 (out of 9) fingerprint patterns have been
used as biometric controls in order to obtain WS scores, and the remaining 4
will be used as marks. No technique will be used to predict degradation in WS
distribution, as fingerprint biometric patterns are all acquired in the same con-
ditions. Therefore, a total of 50 × 4 = 250 target trials and 50 × 49 × 4 = 9800
non-target trials will be used for Tippett plot computation. Population data has
been taken from the same corpus too.
For voice biometric system experiments, the ATVS UBM-MAP-GMM system
[10] has been used. The scores used in the LR computation experiments are
extracted from the ATVS results in the NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation
2004 [11], using only a male subcorpus of 50 users, and all the trials defined
in the evaluation for these users in the core condition, i. e., one conversation
side (5 minutes) for training and one for testing. Strong mismatch on channel
and language conditions is present in this data set, and it exists variability in
the amount of speech per conversation side (as silence removal has not been
performed). As only one speech segment is used as suspect biometric material,
jackknife and prediction techniques described in [10] are used to perform robust
WS estimation. In summary, a total of 163 target trials and 1969 non-target
trials are performed. Population data consists of a channel-balanced English set
of GMM models obtained from development corpora from past NIST SRE.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Tippett plots for fingerprint system estimating BS distribution with different
techniques. (a): ML with M gaussian mixtures: M=1 (solid), M=3 (dashed), M=10
(dash-dot) and M=30 (dotted). (b): KDF with bin size h=10 (solid), h=3 (dashed),
h=1 (dotted).
4.2 Results
Fig. 2 show the performance of the score-based biometric systems in the scenarios
described. The performance of the forensic fingerprint system using the two
techniques described is shown in Fig. 3. As can be seen in Fig. 3(a), performance
of the forensic system in non-target trials degrades as the number of mixtures
(M) increases. ForM=30 mixtures, a small but not negligible proportion of non-
target trials have values of LR greater than 100.000, which is alarming because
the rate of misleading evidence for the non-target curve is critical in forensic
systems [10]. The same conclusion can be extracted for KDF in Fig. 3(b), when
the bin size h is small. This effect is due to an over-fitting effect of the BS model
on the available data set.
Generalization against small sample size effects is inferred from Fig. 4. Two
populations of L = 50 and L = 10 (obtained by sampling) biometric templates
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Analysis of generalization effects with small sample-size data for the fingerprint
biometric system. Population size: L=50 (solid) and L=10 (dotted). (a):ML withM=3
gaussian mixtures, (b): KDF with bin size h=3.
has been used. It can be seen thatKDF andML estimation presents very similar
performance when the data set size is reduced. However, performance of targets
for KDF estimation is better when population size decreases, which means over-
estimation of target LRs due to over-fitting in BS distribution estimation.
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Fig. 5. Tippett plots for voice biometric system estimating BS distribution with ML
and different number of gaussian mixtures.
In the experiments presented using voice biometrics system, ML estimation
is performed to model BS distribution. In Fig. 5, the same effect noticed in Fig.
3(a) can be observed, i. e., the proportion of non-target trials having LR values
greater than one grows as M increases.
Generalization for the voice biometric system is shown in Fig. 6. ML esti-
mation of BS distribution with M=1 and M=8 has been used. It can be seen
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Fig. 6. Analysis of generalization effects using ML for voice biometric system. Popu-
lation size L=60 (solid) and L=12 (dotted) (a): M=1 gaussian; (b): M=8 gaussian.
that as population sample size decreases, over-fitting in the data (M grows) im-
plies degradation on system performance (i.e., bigger proportion of non-target
LRs > 1, and over-estimated target LR).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how biometric systems can be used in forensic
applications, using a LR as a measure of the strength of the evidence computed
from the scores. The need of proper forensic reporting has been highlighted, as
the fact finder needs a meaningful value to assist his decision making. Direct re-
porting using score-based biometric systems has been shown in the literature to
be misleading, and we promote a LR based reporting system. Bayesian analysis
of forensic evidence has been referred as the logical way for evaluating forensic
findings. LR computation process has been reviewed, highlighting that it can
be performed using any score-based biometric system, regardless of the biomet-
ric discipline. Statistical assumptions regarding estimations involved in the LR
computation process have been discussed. The main contribution of the paper
are the experiments regarding small sample size effects in BS estimation, which
can appear in forensic casework when the relevant population is reduced, ei-
ther because of the background information on the case (I) or the availability
of databases matching the suspect biometric template conditions. It has been
shown that the performance of the system degrades when BS distribution over-
fits the data set when its size is small, and misleading evidence in non-target
trials can increase, which is a highly undesirable effect in forensic systems. LRs
for target trials might also be over-estimated in these conditions.
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